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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the economic consequences of milk marketing orders for producers and 
consumers in organic and conventional milk markets.  We develop a multi-market equilibrium 
displacement model that disaggregates the organic and conventional segments of the California 
milk market in order to evaluate the economic effects of alternative policies.  We find that 
exemption of organics from marketing order regulation would make organic farmers better off at 
the expense of conventional farmers, but that complete deregulation would make both organic 
and conventional farms worse off. 
 
 










Copyright 2007 by Balagtas and Kreutzer. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 
notice appears on all such copies. 
                                                 
∗ Balagtas is an Assistant Professor and Kreutzer a graduate student in the Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Purdue University, 403 W. State Street, West Lafayette IN, 47907-2056. Balagtas is contact author: 765-494-4298, 
balagtas@purdue.edu. This research was supported by the Agricultural Experiment Station at Purdue University.   1 
Commodity Policies and Product Differentiation:  
the California Milk Marketing Order and the Organic Dairy Sector 
 
Milk marketing orders have been a central element of dairy policy in the United States since they 
were established as part of the Depression-era farm programs of the 1930s.  Marketing orders set 
minimum prices that processors must pay for milk based on end use, implementing a price 
discrimination scheme (a higher price is set for milk used in beverage products) with revenue 
pooling.  A substantial literature on the economic of milk marketing orders shows that they 
effectively raise the farm-level price, and thus increase economic surplus for participating dairy 
farmers (e.g., Ippolito and Masson; Cox and Chavas; Sumner and Wolf). 
The finding that all dairy producers benefit from milk marketing orders depends on the 
assumption that dairy farmers produce a homogeneous product.  Indeed, the rationalization for 
revenue pooling is that all Grade A dairy farms produce the same product and thus should 
receive a similar price.  However, the assumption of a homogenous product has become 
increasingly tenuous as producers and processors within the dairy sector increasingly use 
product differentiation (e.g., organic, “traditionally” farmed, grass-fed, regional denominations, 
etc.) as a means to increase profits (Lansink, Pietola and Backman 2002).  This gradual 
transition away from commodity-oriented agriculture raises questions about the economic 
consequences of milk marketing orders and other commodity-based farm programs.  
Specifically, commodity-oriented regulation such as milk marketing orders may have 
differential effects on different types of producers. 
Notably, organic dairy products are differentiated from conventional products by a set of 
regulations that affect the production process. The National Organic Program (NOP), which was 
established by the USDA in 1990, restricts the use of certain inputs (e.g., non-organic feed, 
antibiotics) and mandates the use of other inputs (e.g., organic feed and pasture) (Rawson 2005).    2 
Consumers do not view organic and conventional products as perfect substitutes, as evidenced by 
significant premiums for organic products (Dhar and Foltz 2005).  According to Dhar and Foltz, 
consumers are willing to pay as much as $3.00 per gallon more for milk from cows not treated 
with genetically-modified hormones and antibiotics, and fed organic feed.  Yet milk marketing 
orders do not recognize organic milk as a distinct product.  Rather, marketing order regulations 
apply equally to organic and conventional products.  Given that the organic milk market differs 
from the conventional market in both supply and demand, milk marketing order regulations 
likely have different implications for prices, quantities, and welfare in organic and conventional 
milk markets. 
Milk marketing order regulation is not the only commodity-oriented policy that may have 
different implications for producers of differentiated products.  Recent manifestations of this 
conflict include legal challenges to commodity check-offs from producers, and different 
commodity policy preferences for small and large producers.  Generic commodity promotion 
funded by check-offs have come under legal challenge from producers who are attempting to 
produce a differentiated product and do not want to be associated with a commodity.  In two 
recent court cases, producers argued that generic advertising hurts producers of higher quality 
products by sending an unintentional signal to consumers that all generically-advertised brands 
are of the same quality (Crespi and Marette 2002). 
In 2002, a dairy farm filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the USDA’s 
mandatory dairy promotion program.  The farm argued that it uses “traditional” dairy farming 
methods, meaning no hormones or antibiotics are used on the cows and the cows are grazed feed, 
and objected to paying the check-off which funded generic advertising for milk because the 
advertising does not differentiate between conventional and non-conventional milk.  The courts   3 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs stating that “the government may not compel individuals to fund 
speech or expressive associations with which they disagree” (Pittman 2004).  These types of 
arguments have been made against other commodity based programs including California peach 
and nectarines, the national beef check-off, and the national pork check-off (Becker 2005).  The 
2002 Farm Bill contained provisions that exempted any person who produced and marketed only 
100 percent organic products from paying assessments under a commodity promotion law.  
The California milk marketing order has faced similar legal challenges.  In 2002, two 
organic processors in California filed suit against the California Department of Food and 
Agriculture to allow for the exemption of organic milk from the California milk marketing order.  
The plaintiffs argued that the state-imposed pooling fees required them to “subsidize” the 
conventional dairy industry.  Furthermore, one of the companies argued that organic consumers 
pay about $0.50 per gallon more due to the pooling fees (Johnston 2002).  However, in late 2003 
the courts ruled against the organic processors and decided that marketing order regulation 
should treat organic milk similarly as non-organic milk (CDFA “California Dairy Review”).  
This paper attempts to answer the question: Do marketing orders have differential 
economic effects on organic and conventional producers and consumers?  The paper lays out the 
quantitative effects of organic milk and the California milk marketing order regulation on 
producers and consumers.  Unlike previous studies, we disaggregate organic milk from 
conventional milk, and simulate counterfactual scenarios against which we measure organic 
milk’s effects.   
Background: Federal and California Milk Marketing Orders 
The federal milk marketing order is organized into ten regions.  Each of these federal 
marketing orders regulates milk within a geographically defined marketing area.  As of 2005, the   4 
ten federal marketing orders regulated the sale of 60 percent of all milk produced in the country.  
California, which operates its own marketing order, regulates the sale of 21 percent of the 
country’s milk.  Most of the remainder is regulated by other state orders (Maine, Montana, 
Virginia), and a small portion is unregulated (CDFA, “2005 Dairy Statistical Annual”).  
Milk marketing orders use price discrimination and revenue pooling to increase returns to 
dairy farming for participating producers.  Marketing orders set minimum prices that processors 
must pay for raw farm milk based on end-use, raising farm revenue for milk by setting a higher 
minimum price for milk in the fluid market which has relatively inelastic demand.  An average 
or blend price is then paid to all producers regardless of the use of the milk.  Price discrimination 
and pooling of milk effectively raise the farm-level price, and thus economic surplus, for 
participating dairy farmers (e.g., Ippolito and Masson 1978; Sumner and Wolf 1996; Cox and 
Chavas 2001). 
Although the California is administered independently of the federal milk marketing 
orders, it mirrors the federal order in that it has a classified pricing system (prices based on end-
use, with fluid milk receiving the highest price), pools the revenues from all milk sales (fluid and 
manufacturing milk), and distributes the revenues to California dairy producers.  As in the 
federal order, the California order pays producers a monthly blend price that reflects the 
poolwide (i.e. statewide) milk utilization of all classes.  The main difference between the 
California and Federal order is California’s milk quota system.  California producers who own 
quotas receive $0.195 per pound of nonfat solids, or $1.70 per hundredweight of milk (Sumner 
and Wilson 2000).  California’s quota system can be viewed as a modified pooling mechanism in 
which the quota is used to distribute rents created by price discrimination.  With the use of price   5 
discrimination and pooling, California’s milk marketing order also raises the farm-level price 
and producer surplus for participating California dairy producers. 
Because marketing orders raise prices to benefit producers, they have been described as a 
government-sponsored cartel (see, for example, Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p. 456).  Unlike other 
cartels, milk marketing orders do not control supply but raise the average price by law through 
price discrimination.  However, like textbook examples of cartels, the ability of marketing orders 
to raise the price of milk depends on keeping producers and processors within the order.  
Defection of producers from marketing orders undermines the regulatory structure.  Government 
enforcement of milk marketing order regulations prevents such defection.   
Several authors have examined the effects and social costs associated with milk 
marketing order regulation.  Ippolito and Masson (1978) developed a widely used model of the 
federal milk marketing order regulation, which built from Kessel’s (1967) model of price 
discrimination.  Both Kessel (1967) and Ippolito and Masson (1978) found that marketing orders 
increase the Class 1 (fluid milk) price at the farm level, which increases the blend price for 
regulated producers and decreases the Class 2 (manufacturing milk) price.  With the increase in 
the price of Class 1, consumption for fluid milk decreases, but with higher blend prices total milk 
supply increases.  Price discrimination effectively taxes the sale of fluid milk.  Class 2 
production is subsidized as the supply of milk to manufacturing uses increases because of 
increased total production and decreased fluid milk consumption.  The higher incentive price for 
producer makes them better off.    
The same basic framework used by Ippolito and Masson (1978) has been adopted by the 
subsequent literature.  Most recently, Cox and Chavas (2001) and Balagtas and Sumner (2003) 
extend the basic framework to consider the regional implications of marketing orders.  These   6 
papers examine the spillover effects that each regional milk marketing order has on producers 
and consumers in other regions.  A key result here is that each marketing order benefits 
producers in that marketing order at the expense of producers outside the marketing order, 
including producers regulated by other marketing order.  Sumner and Wolf (1996) used a similar 
framework to evaluate the economic implications of the California milk marketing order.  The 
authors modeled how the California policy of classified pricing, blend prices, and quota 
compared with two alternative dairy models 1) federal–style marketing orders which have a 
blend price but operate without quota and 2) a traditional marketing quota (production limiting) 
program.  Sumner and Wolf found that in aggregate, the quota program lead to more milk 
production than a typical marketing quota program (i.e. production limiting), but less milk 
production then blend pricing without milk quota (i.e. the federal milk marketing order).  The 
California order generates more producer surplus and smaller welfare losses than a federal-style 
milk marketing order.  Additionally, the authors found that when Class 1 milk sales expanded, 
production increased less under the quota program than with the federal-style milk marketing 
order.  
Nearly the entire extant literature on milk marketing order regulation treats assumes dairy 
farms within each marketing order are homogeneous, with the implication that higher incentive 
prices for milk make all producers better off.  However, farms exhibit heterogeneity in many 
dimensions, including farm size, production technology, and milk quality, and these differences 
may have implications for the distribution of welfare effects of milk marketing orders, or other 
policies, across producers.  We derive an equilibrium displacement model that allows for a 
particular type of heterogeneity that is of growing importance in U.S. dairy markets; namely, we 
distinguish between organic dairy farms and conventional (i.e., not organic) dairy farms.  As   7 
discussed above, there has been some pressure from organic producers to be exempted from 
marketing order regulation, which is itself an indication that marketing orders may have different 
implications for organic and conventional farms.  We apply our model to quantify the effects of 
California milk marketing order regulation on prices, quantities, and welfare in markets for 
organic and conventional milk. 
Conceptual Model of the California Dairy Industry 
Consider a stylized model of the California milk market in which farm milk is sold to two 
uses, fluid milk and manufacturing milk.  Moreover, dairy farms produce two types of milk: 
conventional milk, which may be used in conventional fluid or manufacturing products, and 
organic milk which is used only in organic fluid products.  Conventional and organic fluid milk 
are imperfect substitutes in consumption.   
Current California milk marketing order regulation sets the minimum price paid by fluid 
milk processors as a fixed differential over the processor price for (conventional) manufacturing 
milk.  The fixed differential is, in essence, a per unit tax levied on conventional and organic fluid 
milk.  The regulation does not distinguish between conventional and organic milk.  Rather, all 
fluid milk processors pay the differential into a pool.  A portion of the tax revenue collected from 
the fluid milk market is given to owners of quota.  The remaining revenue is pooled and paid out 
to producers in the form of a blend price.         
Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium in the conventional and organic milk markets under 
current California milk marketing regulation.  In panel a, Dcf
0(Wcf) is the relatively inelastic 
demand at all prices for conventional fluid milk, and demand for manufacturing milk is assumed 
to be perfectly elastic at price Wcm
0.  Under marketing order regulation Wcf
0 = Wcm
0 + D and is the 
minimum price that conventional processors must pay for fluid milk.  In panel b, Dnf
0(Wnf) is   8 
demand for organic milk.  Price discrimination drives a wedge, D, between the price organic 
processors pay, Wnf
0 and the price received by organic producers, WBn
0.  Equilibrium quantity in 
the organic market is Mnf
0.  Tax revenue from the organic market, DMnf
0, is equal to the area 
marked by horizontal hash markets.   
In panel a, revenue pooling is modeled in by adding tax revenue generated from the 
organic market (again represented by the area with horizontal hash marks) to the tax revenue 
from the conventional market, DMcf
0.  Of the total pooled revenue from both fluid markets, the 
portion allocated to quota owners is represented by the area marked by diagonal hash marks.  
The remaining pool revenue is paid out as an average price to all producers.  Thus, the curved 
line labeled “Blend Price” is average revenue, and is the incentive price for conventional milk 
producers.  (It is assumed here that the price paid to organic producers, WBn
0, is higher than the 
blend price, the difference representing a premium that organic processors pay for organic milk 
relative to conventional milk).  Conventional market equilibrium is found where the blend price 
intersects marginal cost of conventional milk (MCc), at WBc
0, resulting in conventional 
production Mc
0.  At this point, Mcf
0 is supplied to the fluid market and Mcm
0 to the manufacturing 
market. 
Figure 2 graphically depicts market equilibrium under Scenario 1, exemption of organic 
milk from the milk marketing order.  In panel b, elimination of the implicit tax, D, decreases the 
price processors pay for raw organic milk and increases the organic farm price.  Organic market 
equilibrium is price Wnf
1 and quantity Mnf
1
.  Both organic producers and consumers benefit from 
the policy change.  Producer surplus increases as farm prices rise and consumers benefit from 
reduced prices.     9 
In Panel a of Figure 2, exemption of organics reduces pool revenue, resulting in a lower 
blend price.  The downward shift of the blend price curve causes the blend price to drop in the 
equilibrium from WBc
0 to WBc
1, and a reduction in conventional milk production from Mc
0 to 
Mc
1.   
This graphical analysis makes two simplifying assumptions that mask some of the effects 
of exempting organics from the marketing order.  First, demand for conventional manufacturing 
milk is taken to be perfectly elastic.  In fact, with downward-sloping demand for manufacturing 
milk, the reduction in conventional milk production, which causes a reduction in the quantity of 
milk sold to the manufacturing market, would cause an increase in the price of manufacturing 
milk.  The conventional fluid milk price would also rise, given the fixed fluid milk differential. 
Second, the graphical analysis ignores the cross-price effects in demand for conventional 
and organic fluid milk.  Allowing for substitution in demand for organic and conventional fluid 
milk, the lower price of organic milk resulting from organic exemption would cause a reduction 
in conventional fluid milk demand, and thus exacerbate the negative effects of organic 
exemption on conventional dairy farms.  The higher price of conventional fluid milk would, in 
turn, increase demand for organic milk, and thus make organic exemption even more beneficial 
to organic dairy farms. 
Both of these simplifying assumptions are relaxed in the numerical simulation model 
developed below.     
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the elimination of the California milk marketing order.  
Elimination of the marketing order removes price discrimination, milk quota, and revenue 
pooling.  In this scenario it is assumed that there is an absence of market power from 
cooperatives, processors, and retailers.  With this in mind, all conventional milk should receive   10 
the same price regardless of end-use.  Equilibrium in each market is found at the intersection of 
supply and demand.  In the organic market, the equilibrium is similar to that in Figure 2.  In the 
conventional market, total demand is the horizontal sum of the two demand curves, resulting in 
price Wcm
0, production Mc
2, and conventional fluid milk consumption Mcf
2.     
The graphical analysis suggests that elimination of the marketing order makes 
conventional producers worse off and organic producers better off relative to the status quo.  
Here, however, the simplifying assumptions discussed above—perfectly elastic demand for 
manufacturing milk, and no cross-price effects of demand—have important implications for the 
economic effects of deregulation.  First, with perfectly elastic demand, elimination of the 
marketing order must lower the marginal price of conventional milk.  If demand for 
manufacturing milk is downward-sloping, the effect of marketing order regulation on the 
marginal price of manufacturing milk is ambiguous.   
Second, the assumption of no cross-price effects in demand can be important, given the 
relative large changes in fluid milk prices.  Allowing for cross-price effects, the reductions in 
prices of conventional milk causes a decrease in demand for organic milk, and the reduction in 
the price of conventional milk causes an increase in demand for conventional milk.   
In the numerical simulation model that follows, both of these simplifying assumptions are 
relaxed. 
Empirical Model of the California Dairy Industry 
We develop a multi-market equilibrium displacement model (EDM) of the California 
milk market for the purpose of measuring the implications of removing organic milk from the 
marketing order and the full elimination for the California marketing order (see Alston, Norton, 
and Pardey 1995 for a thorough treatment of equilibrium displacement models).  In this section   11 
we describe the model and in the next section we parameterize and simulate the effects of the 
organic milk market on the California milk marketing order.   
In our model, we disaggregate horizontally-linked dairy markets, with explicit supply and 
demand equations for conventional fluid milk, conventional manufactured products, and organic 
fluid milk.  For each of these products, the vertical relationships that link farm production to 
retail demand are modeled (i.e. farm, processor, and retail levels).  The link between the 
conventional and organic markets is that consumers view the two as imperfect substitutes.  
Finally, milk marketing order regulation—price discrimination, the California milk quota, and 
revenue pooling—are all represented in the model.   
In the EDM, we disaggregate the milk by production method, conventional, c, and 
organic, n.  Then to keep the explanation relatively simple, we specify the model with milk used 
in the manufacture of two distinct dairy products, fluid products, f, and manufactured products, m, 
for conventional milk.  For organic milk we assume that all raw milk is being used to meet fluid 
demand.  This assumption abstracts from the small portion of organic milk used to produce 
manufactured products.  However, the vast majority of organic milk is sold to the fluid market.  
Additional assumptions of the model include fixed proportions production technology of dairy 
products and milk markets, and that dairy product markets are perfectly competitive in the 
absence of marketing order regulation.  That is, it is assumed that neither producers, processors, 
nor consumers exercise market power in unregulated dairy markets.    
The multi-market model, with one input and two dairy product outputs is written in 
general form as follows: 
(1)  Conventional milk supply              MTc = Mc (WBc) 
(2)  Organic milk supply                         MTn = Mn (Wnf)   12 
(3)  Production of conventional fluid products         Xcf =γcf(Mcf) 
(4)  Production of conventional manufactured products  Xcm = γcm(Mcm) 
(5)  Production of organic fluid products         Xnf =γnf(Mnf) 
(6)  Conventional fluid product demand           Xcf = Xcf(Pcf,Pnf) 
(7)  Conventional manufactured product demand       Xcm = Xcm(Pcm) 
(8)  Organic fluid product demand      Xnf = Xnf(Pnf,Pcf) 
(9)  Conventional milk adding up condition     MTc = Mcf + Mcm 
(10)  Organic milk adding up condition                 MTn = Mnf 
(11)  Pricing of conventional fluid products     Wcf = γcf [Pcf – MAKEcf] 
(12)  Pricing of conventional manufactured products   Wcm = γcm [Pcm – MAKEcm] 
(13)  Pricing of organic fluid products       Wnf = γnf [Pnf – MAKEnf] 
(14)  Conventional price discrimination      Wcf = Wcm + Dc 
(15)  Milk  Price  Incentive      Wnf = WBn  + θDn      
(16)  Pooled quantity of milk         MPOOL = MTc +  θMTn 
(17)  T o t a l   R e v e n u e        T R   =   M cfWcf + McmWcm +            
                                                              θ(MnfWcf) 
(18)  Pool  Revenue       PR  =  TR  -  QR 
(19)  Conventional blend price of milk      WBC = PR / MPOOL 
Equation (1) expresses the supply of conventional milk, Mc, as a function of the farm 
price of milk, WBc, and equation (2) represents the supply of organic milk, Mn, as a function of 
the price of organic milk at the processing level, Wn.  Equations (3)-(5) are the production 
functions that transform raw milk into dairy products, Xij, where γij is the yield factor for 
production method i and product j, i = (c, n), j = (f, m).    13 
 Equations (6)-(8) are the retail demands for dairy products.  Demand for fluid dairy 
products is interdependent as each demand function is a function of the retail prices for both fluid 
products (i.e. conventional and organic), Pcf and Pnf.  Conventional manufacturing demand is 
expressed as a function of the retail price of milk used in manufacturing products, Pcm, and fluid 
and manufacturing products are assumed to be unrelated in demand.   
Equations (9) and (10) are adding-up conditions that make supply of milk equal demand 
for milk in all uses.  Equations (11)- (13) express the competitive equilibrium condition for milk, 
that the processor price of milk in fluid or manufactured products is equal to the value of the 
marginal product of milk minus the manufacturing costs, or make allowance (MAKE), for that 
particular dairy product, where γij is the marginal product of organic or manufacturing milk in 
product j.  Equation (14) captures price discrimination by the California milk marketing order, 
which raises the price of milk paid by conventional fluid processors by a fixed mark-up, Dc, 
relative to that paid for manufacturing milk.  Similarly, equation (15) expresses price 
discrimination by the marketing order in organic markets.  Under our assumption of no 
manufacturing organic milk, price discrimination essentially acts as a tax that drive a wedge 
between the price processors pay for organic milk and the price organic farms receives.  θ is a 
dummy variable that equals one if organic milk is included in the marketing order, as it is in the 
status quo, and zero otherwise.  Equation (16) calculates the total quantity of milk in the 
California marketing order, or as it is commonly referred to as “the pool.”  Under current policy 
the pool is the sum of both conventional and organic milk produced within the state.  However, 
when we model the elimination of organic milk the pool includes only conventional milk.  
Equation (17) is the total revenue generated by the pool.  When organic milk is included in the 
marketing order, the quantity of organic milk is multiplied by the processor’s price for   14 
conventional fluid milk.  Equation (18) is pool revenue, or the residual revenue after the quota 
revenue, QR, has been removed.  When we model the full elimination of the California 
marketing order, QR, total revenue and pool revenue will be eliminated as all three are artifacts 
of the marketing order regulation.  Equation (19) defines the blend price of milk paid to 
conventional producers under the California milk marketing order.   
Measuring the Effects of Alternative Policies 
Simulation of the model is used to quantify the effects of California milk marketing regulation.  
The status quo policy is compared to two alternative policies:  
1.  Exemption of organic milk from the California marketing order, with the regulation 
applied only to conventional milk.    
2.  Full elimination of the California marketing order.  
Exemption of organics from the marketing order (alternative policy scenario 1) is simulated by 
setting θ = 0.  Full elimination of the California marketing order (alternative policy scenario 2) is 
simulated by eliminating price discrimination (Dc = 0) and eliminating quota revenue (QR = 0), 
in addition to θ = 0. 
The model is calibrated to 2005 data on California milk markets, and parameterized using 
supply and demand elasticities drawn from agricultural economic literature, wherever possible.  
Data, reported in Table 1, were obtained from the California Department of Food and Agriculture.  
No data are available on the actual production of organic milk; however, estimates on market 
share are available.  The California Certified Organic Farmers Association (CCOF) estimates that 
the current organic market share in California is about three percent.  For the purpose of this 
study we estimate that organic production is three percent of the conventional farm production.  
Additionally, no data is available for organic prices.  The organic processor price for organic   15 
fluid milk is estimated to be a fixed mark-up of 45 percent over their conventional counterpart, a 
figure we obtained from private correspondence with officials at the CDFA.  Using this mark-up, 
the organic farm price in the base model is $21.51 per hundredweight which is within the range 
provided by the Dairy Marketing Branch.  Based on observed retail prices, the organic retail 
price is estimated to be $7 per gallon.   
An intermediate time range for supply elasticity of three to seven years is used to allow 
producers to adjust to permanent regulation changes. With this time frame, adjustments in milk 
production due to changes in prices and regulation modifications should be seen.  Chavas and 
Klemme (1986) estimated supply elasticities to range of 0.22 and 1.41 for this time period.  In 
their research, Ippolito and Masson (1978) used an estimated range of 0.4 to 0.9.  Sumner and 
Wolf (1996) used a range of 0.5 to 2.0 for their 1996 study on California dairy policy.  Cox and 
Chavas (2001) used a milk supply elasticity estimate of 0.37.  Balagtas and Sumner (2003) used 
an elasticity of supply of 1.0 for their study.  Chen, Courtney, and Schmitz (1972) estimated 
supply elasticity to be 2.53.  For this study, a supply elasticity of 1.0 is used, which is within the 
range of previous studies.               
  Estimates of own-price elasticity of demand for fluid milk range from -0.34 (Ippolito and 
Masson 1978) to -0.076 (Helmberger and Chen 1994). For manufacturing milk, demand 
elasticities range from -0.35 (Helmberger and Chen 1994; Dahlgran 1980) to -0.2 (Ippolito and 
Masson 1978; Balagtas and Sumner 2003).  In this analysis the regional fluid demand elasticity 
is assumed to be -0.3 and the elasticity of the national demand for manufacturing milk is 
assumed to be -0.3.   
The elasticity of manufacturing demand facing California is calculated ad the elasticity of 
excess demand facing California:      16 


















i is the demand elasticity in i (i = California, United States),  ε
ROC is the milk supply 
elasticity from all United States producers minus California, and s
CA is California’s share of 
United States manufacturing milk.  Given a supply elasticity of 1.0 and a national demand of -
0.3, the elasticity of demand for manufacturing milk facing California is -5.  Manufacturing milk 
demand elasticity facing California is more elastic than the United States because California 
producers face a higher level of competition that includes the United States and the world.   
  According to research done on organic milk, the supply and demand for organic milk are 
more inelastic than conventional milk (Dahr and Foltz 2005; Glaser and Thompson 2000).  We 
have assumed the elasticity of farm supply of organic milk to be 0.5, elasticity of retail demand 
for organic fluid milk to be -0.2.  Cross-price elasticities of demand for organic and conventional 
fluid milk are not available.  We assume that the elasticity of demand for organic milk with 
respect to conventional milk is 0.1, while the elasticity of demand for conventional milk with 
respect to organic milk is 0.2. 
  Supply and demand elasticities used in the model are reported in Table 2. The numerical 
results from simulation analysis depend on our choice of supply and demand elasticities 
parameters, the quantity of organic milk produced in California, and retail price for a gallon of 
fluid organic milk.  In an appendix available from the authors, we examine the sensitivity of our 
results to our assumptions on parameters for elasticity, organic production, and organic retail 
price.   
Results 
Table 3 reports the simulated annual effects of the two alternative dairy policies: scenario 1 
(exemption of organic milk from the marketing order), and scenario 2 (the full elimination of the   17 
California milk marketing order).  For both scenarios, the table reports the equilibrium changes 
in prices and quantities of milk and dairy products, as well as in producer and consumer surplus 
for both conventional and organic markets, relative to the status quo.   
  Exemption of organic milk from the California milk marketing order would eliminate the 
implicit tax on the sale of organic milk, thus increasing the price received by organic farmers and 
decreasing the price paid by organic processors.  Farm-level prices of organic milk rise by 
$0.202 per hundredweight, or 0.93 percent.  Organic processors see a decrease of $1.838 per 
hundredweight, or 8.44 percent.  Organic milk production rises by 0.05 million hundredweight, 
or 0.46 percent.  In turn, lower processor prices for organic milk and increased farm production 
result in lower prices and increased production of organic milk at retail.  Retail prices decrease 
by $0.159 per gallon, or 2.32 percent.  Under the assumption of fixed proportions production 
technology, consumption of organic milk increases by 0.6 million gallons, or 0.46 percent.   
Exemption of organics from the marketing order causes a net reduction in the 
conventional blend price of $0.041 per hundredweight, or 0.3 percent, and reduces conventional 
production by 1.08 million hundredweight, or 0.30 percent.  Minimum class prices for 
manufacturing and fluid milk rise by $0.02 per hundredweight, or 0.1 percent for fluid milk and 
0.2 percent for manufacturing milk.  With the subtle increase in farm prices, retail prices of 
conventional milk and dairy products rise almost imperceptibly.  The subtle increase in retail 
prices, together with a decrease in demand for conventional dairy products, causes a reduction in 
consumption of conventional dairy products.  Consumption of conventional fluid milk falls by 
1.5 million gallons, or 0.25 percent and consumption of conventional manufactured dairy 
products made in California falls by 9.6 million pounds, or 0.31 percent.    18 
Exemption of organic milk from the marketing order makes both organic producers and 
organic consumers better off.  Organic dairy producers see an increase in producer surplus, or net 
revenue, of $2.2 million per year.  Organic consumer surplus increases by $20.8 million per year.  
However, conventional dairy producers are made worse off, as producer surplus for conventional 
farms decline by $14.6 million annually.  Conventional consumers are also made worse off by 
the higher retail prices.  Conventional fluid milk consumer surplus falls by $14.6 million per 
year, and conventional manufactured products consumer surplus falls by $7.1 million per year. 
  Full elimination of California’s milk marketing order regulation removes the price 
differential between conventional fluid-use and manufacturing-use milk, so that a single price 
prevails for conventional milk in all uses.  The price paid by conventional fluid milk processors 
falls by $2.053 per hundredweight, while the price paid by manufacturing processors falls by 
$0.013 per hundredweight.  The retail price of conventional fluid milk falls by $0.177 per gallon, 
or 6.82 percent, and consumption of conventional fluid milk increases by 10.0 million gallons, or 
1.60 percent.  The quantity of manufacturing milk increases by 0.51 million hundredweight, or 
0.17 percent, and the quantity of manufactured products increases by 5.2 million pounds, or 0.17 
percent.  As depicted in panel a of figure 3, demand for manufacturing milk is perfectly elastic 
and elimination of the marketing order causes a reduction in the farm price of milk.  In contrast, 
the numerical simulation reflects the more realistic scenario in which demand for manufacturing 
milk is less than perfectly elastic, so that the increase in the consumption of conventional fluid 
milk (caused by the elimination of the marketing order) results in an increase in aggregate 
demand of conventional milk.  The increase in aggregated demand is enough to cause farm-level 
prices of conventional milk to increase.  The price received by conventional dairy farms   19 
increases by $0.052 per hundredweight, or 0.38 percent.  Higher conventional farm prices cause 
farm production to increase by 1.37 million hundredweight, or 0.38 percent.     
Elimination of the California milk marketing order regulation causes a reduction in the 
retail price of conventional fluid milk, which, in turn, causes a reduction in demand for organic 
milk.  As a result, consumption of organic milk falls by 0.9 million gallons, or 0.71 percent, at 
the retail level despite a lower price.  Farm production of organic milk falls by 0.07 million 
hundredweight, or 0.71 percent.  Elimination of price discrimination, together with reduced 
demand for organic milk, causes the farm price for organic milk to fall by $0.302 per cwt., or 
1.42 percent.  
Higher conventional farm prices create the appearance that conventional farms are better 
off in the absence of the marketing order; producer surplus rises by $18.7 million.  Indeed, 
producers that do not own quota would be better off without the marketing order.  However, the 
gain in producer surplus caused by the slight increase in farm prices, does not take into account 
the elimination of the welfare transfer to quota owners.  Eliminating the marketing order would 
cause a decrease in quota-owners wealth equal to the value of quota—$153.2 million per year.  
Attributing quota rents to conventional producers, elimination of the marketing order reduces 
producer surplus for conventional farms by $134.5 million per year. 
Consumers of fluid and manufacturing products made from conventional products benefit 
as consumer surplus increases by $131.2 and $3.7 million annually, respectively.  This 
corresponds with previous research that has shown that marketing orders harm the consumer, 
thus without the marketing order conventional consumers would see a benefit.  Although organic 
dairy producers gain from being exempted while the California marketing order remains in place 
(i.e., scenario 1), organic producers are made worse off when the order is fully eliminated.  With   20 
full deregulation, the price of conventional fluid milk falls, causing a decrease in demand for 
organic milk; as a result, organic producer surplus falls by $3.1 million per year.  Consumers of 
organic milk also are worse off under deregulation, with organic consumer surplus decreasing by 
$32.1 million.  However, aggregating consumer surplus for conventional and organic fluid milk, 
fluid milk drinkers as a group are better off without the marketing order, although the 
consumption mix tilts towards conventional milk and away from organic milk.     
  The magnitude of the price-, quantity-, and welfare effects of milk marketing order 
regulation differ under different assumptions on model parameters.  A full sensitivity analysis is 
available from the authors. 
Conclusion 
This study examines the likely economic consequences of changes in California milk marketing 
order regulation for two related market segments: conventional and organic.  An equilibrium 
displacement model is developed that explicitly allows for differentiated products (conventional 
and organic) in order to evaluate the effects of policy on the two markets. Results from the 
simulation analysis indicate that both producers and consumers of organic milk would be made 
better off by a policy that exempted organics from milk marketing order regulation.  Exemption 
of organics from marketing order regulations results in higher farm prices of organic milk, lower 
processor prices of organic milk, lower consumer prices for organic products, and increased 
production and consumption of organic milk.  At the same time, exemption of organics from 
marketing order regulation reduces pool revenue, thereby decreasing the blend price received by 
conventional producers.  That is, exemption of organics from marketing order regulation reduces 
the regulatory benefits for conventional producers.     21 
However, a different story emerges from results from a simulation in which the 
California marketing order regulation is eliminated for both conventional and organic markets.  
We find that elimination of the marketing order makes organic producers worse off.  This result 
is driven by the substitution of conventional fluid milk and organic fluid milk in consumption.  
Previous research has shown that marketing orders raise the price of fluid milk which in turn 
causes fluid consumption to fall (Kessel 1967; Ippolito and Masson 1978).  Organic producers 
benefit from the high price of conventional fluid milk caused by the marketing order.  However, 
elimination of the marketing order causes a reduction in retail prices for conventional fluid milk, 
which, in turn, causes a reduction in demand for organic milk.  In addition to making organic 
producers worse off, the elimination of the California marketing order also harms quota-holding 
producers.  Elimination of the marketing order also results in a slight increase in the conventional 
farm price, thereby increasing returns to conventional farmers that do not own quota.  However, 
the loss of quota rents out-weighs the benefits of a small increase in the conventional farm price.  
Thus, deregulation makes both organic and conventional producers who own quota worse off.  
However, conventional producers who do not own quota would be better off without the 
marketing order.   22 
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Table 1. California Dairy Market Data, 2005 
  
PRICES   
   Retail Organic Fluid ($/gal)  3.84 
   Retail Conventional Fluid ($/gal)  2.77 
   Retail Conventional Mfg ($/lb)  3.66 
  
   Processor Organic Fluid ($/cwt)  23.61 
   Processor Conventional Fluid ($/cwt)  15.74 
   Processor Conventional Mfg ($/cwt)  13.70 
  
   Farm Organic ($/cwt)  21.46 
   Farm Conventional ($/cwt)  13.59 
  
   Organic Premium ($/cwt)  7.87 
  
QUANTITY    
   Retail Organic Fluid (millions of gallons)  41.39 
   Retail Conventional Fluid (millions of gallons)   611.26 
   Retail Conventional Mfg (millions of lbs.)  3101.57 
  
   Production Organic Fluid (millions of  cwt)  3.57 
   Production Conventional Fluid (millions of  cwt)  52.70 
   Production Conventional Fluid (millions of  cwt)  304.08 
  
   Milk Supply Organic (millions of  cwt)  3.57 
   Milk Supply Conventional (millions of  cwt)  356.77 
  
REVENUE (millions of $)   
   Total Revenue   5051.41 
   Pool Revenue  4898.24 
  
WELFARE (millions of $)   
   Quota $153.2 
Source: CDFA, and authors calculations.  
  28 
Table 2. Supply and Demand Elasticities Used in Simulations 
  Organic Milk  Conventional Milk 
Elasticity
 of:    
Farm Supply of Milk  0.5  1.0 
Retail fluid Milk Demand     
      Own price  -0.2  -0.3 
      Cross price  0.1  0.2 
Retail Manufacturing Milk Demand     
       National Demand    -0.3 
       Regional Demand     -5.0 
Demand and supply elasticities reflect published estimates based on Chen, Courtney, and 
Schmitz 1972; Ippolito and Masson; Dahlgran 1980; Chavas and Klemme 1986; Helmberger and 
Chen 1994; Cox and Chavas 2001; Balagtas and Sumner 2003.  
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Table 3. Simulated Effects of Scenarios 1 and 2 on Prices, Quantities, and Welfare in 
California Milk Markets Relative to the Status Quo 












PRICES      
  Retail Conventional Fluid ($/gal)  0.002  0.07  -0.177  -6.82 
  Retail Organic Fluid ($/gal)  -0.159 -2.32 -0.202 -2.97 
  Retail Conventional Mfg ($/lb)  0.002  0.06  -0.001  -0.03 
      
  Processor Conventional Fluid ($/cwt)  0.023  0.15  -2.053  -15.00 
  Processor Organic Fluid ($/cwt)  -1.838  -8.44  -2.342  -11.01 
  Processor Conventional Mfg ($/cwt)  0.023  0.17  -0.013  -0.09 
      
  Farm Conventional ($/cwt)  -0.041  -0.30  0.052  0.38 
  Farm Organic ($/cwt)  0.202  0.93  -0.302  -1.42 
      
  OOP ($/cwt)  0.243  2.97  -0.355  -4.68 
      
QUANTITY        
  Retail Conventional Fluid (mil. gal.)  -1.5  -0.25  10.0  1.60 
  Retail Organic Fluid (mil. gal.)  0.6  0.46  -0.9  -0.71 
  Retail Conventional Mfg (mil. lbs)  -9.6  -0.31  5.2  0.17 
      
  Conventional Fluid Utilization (mil. cwt)  -0.13  -0.25  0.86  1.60 
  Organic Fluid Utilization (mil. cwt)  0.05  0.46  -0.07  -0.71 
  Conventional Mfg Utilization (mil. cwt)  -0.94  -0.31  0.51  0.17 
      
  Conventional Farm Milk Production (mil. cwt)  -1.08 -0.30 1.37  0.38 
  Organic Farm Milk Production (mil. cwt)  0.05  0.46  -0.07  -0.71 
      
   Producer Surplus (mil. $)         
      Organic Dairy Farms  2.2    -3.2   
       Conventional Dairy Farms  -14.6    18.7
a  
   Consumer Surplus         
      Organic Fluid Milk Consumers  20.8    -33.6   
      Conventional Fluid Milk Consumers  -14.3    131.2   
      Conventional Mfg. Milk Consumers  -7.1    3.7   
a/ Does not include the foregone quota rents worth $153.2 million per year. Attributing quota 
rents to conventional producers, elimination of the marketing order reduces producer surplus for 
conventional farms by $134.5 million per year. 
 
 
 